Twelve hidden sub-criteria under ‘methodology’: Council of State annuls award of auditing contracts in Boussu and Mons to Ernst & Young
The Walloon Region assessed the ‘methodology’ criterion (40 points) for the audit follow-up of the Plan Tonus in Boussu and Mons on the basis of twelve weighted sub-criteria that only surfaced in the evaluation report — from ‘specific knowledge of the municipality’ to ‘participation in budget work (CRAC and DGPL)’ — and the Council of State therefore annulled the award of both lots to Ernst & Young, citing the Court of Justice’s Lianakis case law.
What happened?
In autumn 2007 the Walloon Region launched an open tender for the auditing assignment to follow up the Plan Tonus Axe II, under which auditors check for individual municipalities whether their management plan is still relevant and properly implemented. The contract, estimated at 1 million euros, was divided into 52 lots and was published, among other places, in the Official Journal of the European Union on 3 October 2007. Article 115 of the specifications listed four award criteria: the proposed methodology (40 points), price (30), the quality and precision of the proposed report template (20) and the proposed additional assignments, ‘for example an in-depth analysis of a department or of consolidated entities’ (10). At the opening on 19 November 2007, SPRL Joiris-Rousseaux & Co had bid for seven lots. On 4 December 2007 the minister for Internal Affairs and the Civil Service awarded lot 7 (Boussu) and lot 35 (Mons) to SCRL Ernst & Young Réviseurs d’entreprises. In Boussu, Joiris-Rousseaux was cheapest at 9,000 euros excl. VAT, but Ernst & Young won at 9,120 euros excl. VAT because its methodology was ‘more interesting’: it included ‘proposals for additional analyses, both for the municipality and for the consolidated entities’. Of Joiris-Rousseaux, the decision said that its methodology, like Ernst & Young’s, was based on the 2002 methodology note of the steering committee, with on-site visits ‘as in the past’. In Mons, where Deloitte had also bid, Ernst & Young was best on both methodology and price (21,850 euros excl. VAT). The decisions were only notified to Joiris-Rousseaux on 16 January 2008, in the course of summary proceedings before the Namur court of first instance, which were dismissed on 21 March 2008. On 11 March 2008 Joiris-Rousseaux applied to the Council of State for annulment; Ernst & Young intervened. Ernst & Young first challenged admissibility: the decision to sue had been taken by a ‘management committee’ of two persons, one of whom, Bernard Rousseaux, had not yet had his appointment as manager published. The Council found it ‘excessively formalistic’ to declare that decision invalid, since it had also been signed by Jean-Marie Joiris, whose status as manager was established. On the merits, Joiris-Rousseaux argued that the Region had split the methodology criterion into twelve sub-criteria in the evaluation report, had assessed elements from the fourth criterion (additional assignments) under the first, and had given it only 4 out of 12 points on the methodology grid, with no points for its knowledge of Mons, where it had been active since the start of the Plan Tonus. With a reasonable 10 out of 12, it would by its own calculation have scored 99 points in Boussu instead of 79 (against 89.6 for Ernst & Young) and 93.2 in Mons instead of 69.2 (against 88). The Region replied that these were not sub-criteria but ‘parameters’, objective elements drawn from the offers themselves, and that it was logical to determine them only after receiving the offers, since market operators have more experience in this field than the authors of the specifications; moreover, Joiris-Rousseaux had won four of its seven lots with the same method. The Council read the evaluation report differently. Its point 2.3 divided the first criterion into three headings (municipality, consolidated entities and methodology), each with four components, such as ‘specific knowledge of the municipality’, ‘interviews with local decision-makers’ and ‘participation in budget work (CRAC and DGPL)’. These are twelve sub-criteria which, according to the table in annex IV of the report, determined whether an offer received points, and one of them alone produced a ten-point gap between the offers of Joiris-Rousseaux and Ernst & Young. Article 16 of the Act of 24 December 1993 and article 115 of the Royal Decree of 8 January 1996, read in the light of Directives 2004/17 and 2004/18 and the Court of Justice’s ATI EAC and Lianakis judgments, require that all elements the authority takes into account and their relative importance be known when bidders prepare their offers. Nothing in the specifications suggested that ‘methodology’ would be assessed on specific knowledge of the municipality or participation in budget work, and such sub-criteria and their weighting could have influenced the preparation of the offers. The plea was well founded; the second plea was not examined. The Council annulled the award of lots 7 (Boussu) and 35 (Mons). The Walloon Region bears 175 euros in costs, Ernst & Young 125 euros.
Why does this matter?
This judgment applies the 2008 Lianakis case law to an everyday practice: an authority that announces a broad qualitative criterion such as ‘methodology’ and decides only when analysing the offers what exactly it will look at. The Walloon Region defended this expressly — bidders know more than we do, so let us infer from their offers which elements count — and the Council of State rejected that reasoning outright. The label does not matter: an authority that calls elements ‘parameters’ but attaches points to them in a scoring table is using weighted sub-criteria. What is decisive is whether those elements, had they been known in advance, could have influenced the preparation of the offers. For ‘specific knowledge of the municipality’ or ‘participation in budget work’ this is obvious: an auditor who knows these elements earn points will highlight them. The judgment also shows how heavily such a hidden sub-criterion can weigh: one component made a ten-point difference, enough for a more expensive offer to win in Boussu. It also contains a useful procedural note: the Council refuses to declare a company’s action inadmissible on the basis of a formal defect in the decision to sue, where it is established that a duly appointed manager co-signed it.
The lesson
For authorities: decide before publication which elements you will assess under each qualitative criterion and how much they weigh, and put that in the specifications. An evaluation report that afterwards splits a criterion into points per component is not a ‘refinement’ but a change to the rules of the game, whatever you call it. If you want to leave room for bidders’ creativity, describe in the specifications which aspects you value and how much they weigh, and stick to that in the evaluation. Watch the boundaries between criteria too: elements announced under ‘additional assignments’ do not belong, unannounced, in the assessment of methodology. For bidders: ask for the evaluation report and scoring tables. If you see components there that were not in the specifications or notice and that earn points, you have a strong plea, even if the authority calls them ‘parameters’. Like Joiris-Rousseaux, make concrete what difference in points it could have made; that makes the interest and seriousness of the breach tangible.
Ask yourself
As an authority: is every element that earns points in the assessment of a qualitative criterion stated, with its weighting, in the specifications or the notice? If you use a criterion such as ‘methodology’ or ‘approach’: do you know before the opening of offers exactly what you will look at? Do you respect the boundaries between criteria, so that elements announced under another criterion are not assessed twice or in the wrong place? As a bidder: have you requested the evaluation report and the annexes with the scoring, and compared them with the criteria in the specifications? Can you show what difference an unannounced sub-criterion made to your score? Was your company’s decision to sue taken or signed by a manager whose appointment has been published?
About this database
The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →