A ‘negative cost’ for biomass and a single rate for grass and pruning wood: Van Gansewinkel loses IVM Meetjesland’s green-composting contract to De Bree Solutions
Van Gansewinkel finished with 92.88 points against 99 for De Bree Solutions in IVM Meetjesland’s contract for processing garden waste, and challenged the award because De Bree charged a negative price for processing biomass and handled grass, pruning wood and mixed green waste at the same rate; the Council of State dismissed the urgent application, because the contracting authority had reasonably accepted the price justifications, the rate differences in the specifications were mere assumptions, and the ranking method for the quality criteria had been set out in advance in the specifications.
What happened?
The Intermunicipal Association for Household Waste Processing Meetjesland (IVM) launched a services contract by general call for tenders for the processing of separately collected garden waste and the marketing of the resulting green compost (specifications BB 207/10, published in the Belgian Bulletin of Tenders on 23 April 2010 and in the Official Journal of the EU on 27 April 2010). It was a price-list contract: bidders quoted gate fees for mixed green waste, pruning wood, grass and verge cuttings, and stumps and roots, plus in item 6 the ‘extra cost’ of separating, processing and delivering biomass. The specifications stated that IVM ‘assumed’ pruning wood would have the lowest rate and grass and verge cuttings a higher one, ‘in line with the polluter-pays motto’. The award criteria were price (60 points) and quality and professionalism (40 points, split over six sub-criteria). For those sub-criteria IVM ranked the tenders item by item: first place received the maximum, second the maximum minus one, and so on. Five bidders submitted tenders. Because prices for items 1 to 3 and 6 varied widely, IVM asked everyone for a price justification on 15 July 2010. De Bree Solutions had quoted a small ‘negative cost’ for item 6 and explained it, among other things, by the fact that the material did not need to be shredded and screened again and that transport to its site in Maldegem could be scheduled as return loads. For grass, pruning wood and mixed green waste De Bree applied a single price, to avoid disputes at acceptance. IVM accepted all justifications and ranked De Bree first (99 points), ahead of Van Gansewinkel (92.88), Indaver (78.74), Op De Beeck (76.06) and Sede Benelux (75.30). The board awarded the contract to De Bree on 21 September 2010; Van Gansewinkel was informed by letter of 22 September 2010 and sought suspension under extreme urgency on 6 October 2010. Because the contract was published after 24 February 2010, the new remedies act of 23 December 2009 already applied: serious harm difficult to repair was no longer required, only a serious plea. The Council found none. Article 96(4) of the Royal Decree of 8 January 1996, which prohibits skewing overheads and profit across items, applies only to works. A negative price for item 6 was not impossible, since the specifications only referred to ‘possible’ extra operations and the bidder already received a gate fee. IVM could reasonably accept the logistical explanation based on return loads to Maldegem. The differentiated rates in the specifications were not binding provisions but assumptions of the authority (‘IVM assumes that…’), and Indaver and Sede also quoted equal or nearly equal rates. The ranking method had been set out in advance and had not disadvantaged Van Gansewinkel: it scored higher than De Bree on no quality sub-criterion and lower on most, so larger point gaps would only have pushed it further back. The point differences for process management (more frequent turning, more elaborate corrective measures), process monitoring (temperature measurement three times a week versus fortnightly, an on-site weather station, a monthly briefing on top of reporting) and sale of end products (De Bree also described what would happen to soil from tree roots and the residual fraction) were adequately reasoned. The criticism of the assessment of staff experience could in any event not bridge a gap of more than six points. De Bree’s intervention was admitted and the application dismissed; Van Gansewinkel bore 175 euros in costs, De Bree 125 euros for the intervention.
Why does this matter?
The judgment combines three lessons that remain just as relevant today. First, price examination: an authority that asks all bidders for a justification and weighs those justifications concretely in the award report has a wide margin of appreciation. A negative unit price is not in itself proof of abnormality; what matters is whether the bidder can explain why it can offer that price — here, a logistical advantage due to the proximity of its own site. Second, the distinction between what specifications require and what they expect. A sentence such as ‘the authority assumes that…’ imposes no obligation, and a bidder who departs from it does not submit an irregular tender. Bidders attacking a competitor’s tender for ‘contradicting the specifications’ must therefore first check whether the provision is binding. Third, the rank-based assessment method, in which point gaps between tenders are always just one point, regardless of the size of the quality difference. The method is crude, but the Council accepts it as long as it is announced in advance and does not make comparison of tenders impossible. Moreover, whoever criticises it must show that it concretely disadvantaged them — difficult when you score lower on almost every sub-criterion. The judgment thus also illustrates the interest requirement for pleas: criticism that cannot reverse the ranking is not even examined on the merits.
The lesson
For contracting authorities: when unit prices diverge sharply, ask all bidders for a price justification, summarise it per bidder in the award report and explain why you accept it. State clearly in the specifications what is mandatory and what is merely an expectation, and announce the assessment method for the quality criteria in advance — the Council will hold you and the bidders to it. Justify every point difference with concrete, comparable elements from the tenders (frequency of measurements, detailed corrective measures, reporting). For bidders: an unusually low or even negative price from a competitor is only challengeable if you can show that the authority unreasonably accepted the justification. If you want to contest a rank-based method, preferably do so before submission, and calculate whether another method would actually have made you win. Pay attention in your tender to details that seem marginal at first sight, such as the sale of by-products: in a system where each place is worth one point, they count in full.
Ask yourself
Do your specifications clearly state what is a binding provision and what is a mere assumption or expectation of the authority? As an authority, have you asked all bidders for a justification of divergent unit prices and assessed each of them in the award report? Do you know that a negative unit price is not automatically abnormal if the bidder can plausibly justify it? If you want to challenge a rank-based method, have you calculated whether another method would actually have changed the final ranking in your favour? Does your tender describe the seemingly minor parts of the contract — reporting, corrective measures, the outlet for by-products — as concretely as your competitors do?
About this database
The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →