Night medical mail delivery Liège: price verification by hospital purchasing central sufficiently motivated despite succinct formulation
The Council of State rejects a challenge against the award of a contract for night medical mail delivery in the province of Liège, because the contracting authority — acting as purchasing central for four hospitals — conducted a genuine and concrete price verification under Article 36 of the Placement Royal Decree, and the decision's motivation, though succinct and allusive due to confidentiality requirements, sufficiently demonstrates that the chosen tenderer's prices are not abnormal.
What happened?
The Centre Hospitalier Bois de l'Abbaye (CHBA), acting as purchasing central for four hospitals in the province of Liège, tendered through a negotiated procedure with prior publication for collection and delivery of medical and non-medical mail. Lot 1 concerned night collection and delivery of medical correspondence between hospitals and healthcare professionals, to be delivered by 7:00 AM. Award criteria were price (90 points) and quality of service (10 points, based on guaranteed night delivery percentage). The contract fell under 'social and other specific services' (Annex III). Price verification rules do not normally apply to such contracts in negotiated procedures, but the specifications expressly declared Articles 84 of the Act and 33-36 of the Royal Decree applicable. Postalia Belgium (incumbent contractor) submitted an offer. Lot 1 was awarded to DDP Messagerie at €451,723.76 annually — 27% lower than Postalia's offer. Postalia argued the price verification motivation was insufficient: only vague references to three service types without concrete elements explaining why prices were considered normal. The Council found the motivation sufficient despite being succinct. The dual obligation — motivation must demonstrate effective verification while respecting confidentiality — was properly balanced. The decision showed: prices were verified under Article 36; DDP provided concrete justifications per service type (collection through mutualisation with existing routes, sorting through documented equipment and staffing, distribution through route-optimising application and staffing hours); monthly turnover covers all costs with acceptable margin. The administrative file contained detailed analysis (comparative tables, explanatory note on price control). DDP's justifications were concrete and quantified. The 27% price difference alone does not establish abnormality — price verification aims to ensure proper execution, not explain price differences. Postalia's own 46% price variation between initial and final offer undermined its market stability argument. The sole ground was not serious. The application was rejected.
Why does this matter?
For social and other specific services under negotiated procedure, price verification rules apply only if the specifications expressly provide for them. Price verification motivation may be succinct when confidentiality requires it, provided it demonstrates genuine verification. A 27% price difference alone does not establish abnormality — price verification aims to ensure proper execution, not explain price differences between tenderers.
The lesson
As a contracting authority: for social services contracts, expressly declare price verification rules applicable in the specifications. Succinct motivation is acceptable to protect confidentiality, but it must demonstrate genuine verification. Maintain detailed analysis in the administrative file. As a tenderer: a price difference alone does not establish abnormality. Provide concrete evidence of inadequate justification or manifest error. Your own pricing behaviour (large variations between offers) may undermine your credibility.
Ask yourself
As a contracting authority: have you expressly declared price verification rules applicable for social services? Does your motivation demonstrate genuine verification without disclosing confidential data? Does the administrative file contain detailed analysis? As a tenderer: are you providing concrete evidence beyond the mere price difference? Does your own pricing behaviour support your credibility?
About this database
The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →