Rejection Dutch-speaking chamber

Summer bar at the Hemiksem abbey: losing out on a concession means losing a chance, not income — and that is not enough for suspension

Ruling nr. 267005 · 15 June 2026 · Xe kamer

BV E., set up specifically to run the summer bar at the Sint-Bernardus abbey in Hemiksem, sought suspension of the award of that concession to BV B. (90 against 72.2 out of 100 points), but the Council of State held that a financial plan with expected income does not show serious harm and that missing out on a concession is a risk inherent in any competition, and dismissed the application for lack of urgency.

What happened?

On 20 January 2026 the municipal council of Hemiksem approved the concession guidelines ‘Call for applications: operation of the Hemiksem summer bar’. The aim was to give the Sint-Bernardus abbey a ‘new, accessible and temporary function’, with partnerships with local suppliers and entrepreneurs, and to bring the heritage site back to the attention of the wider public. The summer bar had to be open from April to September; March and October were optional, with closing times at midnight on weekdays and 1 a.m. on Fridays and Saturdays, and two closing days a week allowed. The guidelines stated expressly that the award did not fall under public procurement law, but that the concession would be granted after a call for (price) offers, with exclusion grounds, selection and award criteria and a concession agreement afterwards. The agreement would run for one year, tacitly renewable annually up to a maximum of five years. The award criteria were ‘Concept’ (40 points) and ‘Concession fee’ (60 points). BV E. and BV B. both submitted offers in time, and at the municipality’s request of 3 March 2026 both supplied additional information in time. In the evaluation report of 14 March 2026 BV B. scored 90 out of 100 points and BV E. 72.2. On 23 March 2026 the board of mayor and aldermen awarded the concession to BV B. On 27 April 2026 BV E. asked the Council of State for ordinary suspension of that decision, alongside an action for annulment. BV B. intervened and raised admissibility objections. The Council left those open, because the suspension failed on urgency in any event. BV E. argued that immediate implementation made it impossible for it to run the bar and caused it ‘a substantial drop in income’. It stressed, also at the hearing, that it had been set up specifically to run the summer bar, that the concession was therefore an indispensable condition for starting up, and that without it the company would have to cease its activities; a financial plan was attached to its offer. The Council, in line with the opinion of first auditor Sofie De Doncker, found this insufficient. The application did not explain in any way why the financial harm was serious. The financial plan showed at first sight only the planned sources of financing at incorporation and the expected income and expenditure for at least two years, but no income already received or costs already incurred. And merely invoking the loss of a chance to run the summer bar, with the income forgone, is not enough: that is a risk inherent in any participation in a competitive procedure. ‘The applicant does not lose a concession, it is simply not awarded one.’ That the company had been set up solely to run this summer bar made no difference. BV B.’s intervention was allowed and the application for suspension dismissed, without the pleas being examined.

Why does this matter?

The judgment shows how high the threshold for ordinary suspension is in an award dispute, even outside classic procurement law. Hemiksem had expressly provided that the summer-bar concession did not fall under public procurement law, but it did organise a full competition with offers, selection, award criteria and scoring. The Council of State treated the application against the board’s award decision as an ordinary application for suspension; the applicant therefore could not rely on the special, relaxed regime that procurement law provides for extreme-urgency applications against award decisions. The ordinary test of article 17 then applies: urgency is not presumed and must be shown concretely and with evidence. The key insight is the reasoning on ‘loss of a chance’: whoever is not awarded a concession does not lose existing income but an expectation, and that expectation is open to question in every bid. Even an entrepreneur who has built its entire existence on one concession — BV E. was set up specifically for it — does not escape that logic. For municipalities that award terraces, beach bars, kiosks or event venues through a ‘call for applications’, this is a reassuring signal; for candidates, a warning that the suspension route yields little without hard proof of real and serious harm.

The lesson

For prospective concessionaires: an application to suspend a concession you missed out on stands or falls with concrete evidence of serious harm. A financial plan with forecasts is not proof of damage; show which costs you have already incurred, which commitments you have entered into (rent, staff, suppliers, equipment) and why the harm cannot be remedied afterwards. Know too that ‘we were set up specifically for this’ is no trump card: you bear the risk of not being chosen from the moment you bid. Tailor your litigation strategy to whether the annulment procedure or a damages claim is more realistic. For municipalities: concession guidelines with clear exclusion, selection and award criteria and a reasoned evaluation report, as in Hemiksem, limit litigation risk. Even if the award falls outside public procurement law, the board’s award decision was challenged before the Council of State here, and a careful file is then your best defence.

Ask yourself

As a candidate: can you show with documents which costs you have already incurred and which commitments you have entered into, and not only what income you expected? Do you realise that missing out on a concession or contract is treated in case law as an inherent risk of competition, and not as a loss of existing income? Is ordinary suspension the right remedy for you, or does the annulment procedure or a damages claim offer better prospects? As an authority: do your concession guidelines state clearly whether the procedure falls under public procurement law, and which criteria and weighting you apply? Is your award decision based on an evaluation report that makes the scoring per criterion understandable?

About this database

The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →