Lower total price, still lost: in Saint-Ghislain Pluxee ran into specifications that counted only three of the eight price items
Pluxee Belgium offered the city of Saint-Ghislain and its public social welfare centre electronic meal vouchers at a total price that was, by its account, half that of Edenred Belgium, but lost by 85 to 100 points because the specifications counted only item 1 and items 2 and 3 of the inventory for the price criteria, where Edenred was cheaper; the Council of State held that Pluxee confused the most economically advantageous tender with the total offer amount, that its criticism of the choice of assessed items in fact targeted the specifications and came too late, and dismissed the extreme-urgency application.
What happened?
The city of Saint-Ghislain, acting as lead contracting authority in a joint contract with the public social welfare centre (CPAS) of Saint-Ghislain, awarded a public supply contract for the issue and delivery of electronic meal vouchers for the municipal administration and the CPAS. It classified the contract as a low-value contract within the meaning of article 92 of the Law of 17 June 2016, but nevertheless used specifications (no. 20265049). The contract ran for one year, tacitly renewable three times, for a maximum of four years. It was to be awarded to the most economically advantageous tender on the basis of four award criteria. Annex B to the specifications contained an inventory of eight items to be completed by bidders. Three companies were invited; two submitted offers: NV Pluxee Belgium and NV Edenred Belgium. On 15 April 2026 the HR department drew up a tender evaluation report comparing both offers on the four criteria and proposing Edenred as the most economically advantageous bidder. On 21 April 2026 the municipal board approved that report, made it an integral part of its decision and awarded the contract to Edenred. Pluxee was notified on 24 April (the letter was sent on 28 April) and immediately requested the award decision and the report. On 6 May it received the decision, but without the report. On 13 May it contested the decision in writing and asked for the contract to be awarded to it. On 21 May 2026 it sought suspension under extreme urgency; it only received the evaluation report on 22 May, the day after its application. Its single plea had two limbs. First, the city had allegedly determined the most economically advantageous tender solely on cost, disregarding the other announced criteria. Second, the city had allegedly ranked Edenred first on cost, although Pluxee offered the lowest cost — according to Pluxee, the decision itself showed that Edenred’s cost was twice as high. At the hearing Pluxee added that only cost had separated the two offers, that the criteria ignored item 4 of the inventory (the cost of ordering a new card), although that item would certainly be used during performance, and that Edenred had speculated on that item knowing it would not be assessed. The Council did not agree. The report, which formed part of the decision, showed that the city had indeed compared the offers on all four criteria; the fact that Pluxee did not know the report when filing its application changed nothing. That both offers received the same score on the third and fourth criteria — which have nothing to do with cost — did not mean the city had looked only at price. The second limb, according to the Council, rested on a confusion between the most economically advantageous tender and the total offer amount, the sum of the eight items. The specifications based the first criterion solely on the total costs (VAT included) of item 1 and the second on the sum of items 2 and 3; items 4 to 8 did not count for the evaluation, but did count for the total offer amount. That choice came from the specifications, not from the evaluation, and the application did not challenge the specifications. Both offers scored equally on criteria 1, 3 and 4; on criterion 2 Edenred was cheaper, giving it 100 points against 85 for Pluxee. The complaint about item 4 being left out was a new plea that Pluxee did not formally raise and that would in any event have been late: it knew the specifications and had the report since 22 May, so it had ample time to warn the city and the auditor. Pluxee’s reliance on articles 2 and 3 of the Law of 29 July 1991 to challenge the substantive accuracy of the reasons was, moreover, the wrong legal basis. Since the plea was not serious, the Council did not examine the balancing of interests requested by the city. The offers and Pluxee’s price inventory remained confidential. The application was dismissed; Pluxee bears 200 euros in roll fees, a 26-euro contribution and a 770-euro procedural indemnity.
Why does this matter?
The judgment highlights a distinction bidders regularly lose sight of: the most economically advantageous tender is the one that scores best on the award criteria as defined in the specifications, not necessarily the one with the lowest total amount. When an authority counts only some of the price items, a bidder that is much cheaper overall can still lose. Whether such specifications are wise — Pluxee rightly pointed out that an unassessed item that will certainly be used invites speculation — is another question, but it must then be raised against the specifications themselves, in time and in the application. A bidder that accepts the specifications and attacks only the evaluation gets a review of whether the rules were applied correctly, and Saint-Ghislain passed that test. The judgment also confirms that the evaluation report approved and incorporated by the award decision forms part of its reasoning, even if the bidder receives it only after filing its application. A bidder that then receives the report must announce any new grievances immediately; waiting until the hearing is too late. Finally, a technical point: the Law of 29 July 1991 concerns formal reasoning; a party disputing the substantive accuracy of the reasons relies on the principle of substantive reasoning.
The lesson
For bidders: run your offer through the award criteria and evaluation method of the specifications, not through your total price. Check which inventory items count and which do not; that is where the contract is decided. If you think an unassessed item invites speculation, ask a question before submission or challenge the specifications, and in any case include that criticism explicitly in your application. If you receive the evaluation report only after your application, notify the authority and the auditor immediately if you want to raise new grievances. And choose the right legal basis: formal reasoning is not the same as substantive reasoning. For authorities: if you deliberately leave certain items out of the evaluation, it is wise to justify why, especially if those items will certainly be used during performance — you bear the risk of speculative prices yourself, even if the award stands legally. Send the evaluation report together with the award decision; that avoids an application based on incomplete information.
Ask yourself
As a bidder: have you calculated how your offer scores on each award criterion separately, and which price items count in the evaluation? If an unassessed item will certainly be used, did you raise or challenge that choice in the specifications in time? On receiving the evaluation report after your application, did you immediately signal that you wished to raise new grievances? As an authority: can you justify why certain inventory items do not count in the award criteria, and have you assessed the risk of speculative prices on those items? Do you send the evaluation report together with the award decision to unsuccessful bidders?
About this database
The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →