Rejection Dutch-speaking chamber

Round two at De Watergroep: after suspension and withdrawal, lot 6 is awarded again to the same firm — and this time the decision stands

Ruling nr. 267384 · 10 July 2026 · XIIe vakantiekamer

After the Council of State suspended the first award of lot 6 of De Watergroep’s grounds-maintenance framework agreement in April 2026 for inadequate reasoning on the regularisations, De Watergroep withdrew that decision, requested a further price explanation and again awarded the lot to K. NV; G. BV saw in its competitor’s spectacular price drop a leak of its own tender price and also challenged the regularisations and the price examination, but the Council found none of the pleas serious and dismissed the application.

What happened?

The Vlaamse Maatschappij voor Watervoorziening (De Watergroep) put out a services contract ‘20250110 Framework agreement grounds maintenance’ for maintenance works and green-space management on its sites. The contract had six lots, each a one-year framework agreement renewable up to seven times for one year. The specifications set four award criteria: price (60 points), quality of service (15), cooperation with a sheltered-employment company (‘maatwerkbedrijf’) (10) and quality control (15). Three tenderers bid for lot 6 (sites in the East region – Limburg), including G. BV and K. NV. The procedure involved negotiations: on 26 January 2026 all tenderers were invited to submit an adjusted tender, with each tender being told of unit prices that were ‘apparently abnormally high’ or ‘apparently abnormally low’. On 27 February 2026 De Watergroep awarded the lot to K. NV. By judgment no. 266.297 of 3 April 2026 the Council of State suspended that decision under extreme urgency, after which De Watergroep withdrew it on 24 April 2026. On 6 May 2026 it asked the chosen tenderer to explain the unit price of item 11, and on 29 May 2026 its board again awarded lot 6 to K. NV. On 15 June 2026 G. BV applied for suspension under extreme urgency. Its first plea: De Watergroep had allegedly disclosed its total tender price to K. NV during the negotiations. It relied on four ‘very clear indications’: according to ‘a good source’, K. NV had initially submitted the most expensive tender; the initial totals were missing from the award report; K.’s price optimisation must have been at least 15%; and while G. slightly raised its price, K. lowered its own ‘spectacularly’. The Council held that all tenderers had been invited to submit an adjusted tender, that prices can move in both directions in a negotiated procedure, that the award report need not state the initial total prices, and that a tenderer told that certain items are above average may well adjust its price; even an atypical price drop does not prove a leak, nor do G.’s unsubstantiated ‘experiences’ in other procurements. The second plea targeted the regularisations K. NV had been allowed to make. The specifications expressly allowed substantial irregularities to be regularised before negotiations. K. NV had added three sites for one item to the list of sites entrusted to a sheltered-employment company; according to the award report its tender ‘strictly speaking’ already met the minimum requirement and the change was ‘in any event very limited’. In the Council’s view this did not amount to a new tender, even though the change concerned a separate award criterion; and G. was not treated unequally, since its own tender had been declared regular without any regularisation. The unit price for item 1, which the award report described as ‘significantly higher (tenfold)’ than the same item in the other lots, was corrected in line with those lots — at first sight the correction of a clerical error. In its third plea G. argued that De Watergroep had in reality carried out a special examination of abnormal prices (art. 44 Royal Decree of 18 June 2017) for items 11 and 18, but had artificially presented it in the decision as a general price examination (art. 43) to escape the heavier duty to state reasons. The Council disagreed: the invitations nowhere referred to article 44, the award report itself called the words ‘apparently abnormal’ ‘unfortunate’ — they merely indicated the order of magnitude of price differences — and the later requests for explanation did not mention article 44 either. The reasoning for item 11 (a detailed price breakdown, consistency with the other lots, adjusted performance rates) and for item 18 (a new item for which a site visit had been organised beforehand, so that a wide spread of prices is unsurprising) was not boilerplate. The application was dismissed. G. bears a roll fee of 200 euros, a contribution of 26 euros and a procedural indemnity of 770 euros for De Watergroep; K. NV bears the 150-euro roll fee for its intervention.

Why does this matter?

The judgment is the second act of a case that ended differently in April. Then, the Council suspended the award because the award report gave too vague reasons for the regularisations; De Watergroep fixed that, withdrew its decision, carried out further examination and reached the same award — which now stands. It shows how a suspension often does not change the authority’s choice, but forces it to substantiate that choice better. On substance, the judgment draws three useful lines. First: a bidder alleging a leak of confidential price information must offer more than a competitor’s striking price drop; in a negotiated procedure, price movement is precisely the point, and suspicions from ‘a good source’ carry no weight. Second: a regularisation before negotiations is permissible as long as it does not become a new tender — three extra sites for one item under a sheltered-employment criterion, or a tenfold unit price that is clearly a mistake, stay within that limit. Third: whether an authority conducts a special price examination depends on what it actually does and says, not on one unfortunately chosen word in an invitation. An authority that has prices explained as part of the general price examination and concludes they are not abnormal need not set out that examination at length in its decision, as long as the reasons appear from the file.

The lesson

For bidders: an accusation that the authority passed on your price is serious and requires concrete evidence. A competitor that drops sharply after negotiations while you rise slightly is not proof in itself — certainly not when everyone could submit an adjusted tender. Look critically instead at what exactly was regularised and how the award report explains it: that was the plea that did succeed in the first round. For contracting authorities: a suspended award can, after withdrawal, be granted again to the same bidder, provided the new decision cures the defects. Describe regularisations concretely (who, what, with what result), reason price assessments item by item with reference to the features of the contract, and choose your words carefully: speaking of ‘apparently abnormal’ prices in an invitation invites the objection that a special price examination has begun. Here De Watergroep fended off that objection by explaining in the award report itself that the wording was ‘unfortunate’.

Ask yourself

Can you substantiate a suspected price leak with more than your competitor’s price trajectory? Do you know that a regularisation before negotiations only becomes unlawful when it amounts to a new tender, and that an obvious clerical error in a unit price may be corrected? Do you know the difference between a general price examination (art. 43 Royal Decree of 18 June 2017) and a special inquiry into abnormal prices (art. 44)? And as an authority: does your award report state concretely which bidders received which regularisations, and do you avoid wording in your questions to bidders that suggests an abnormal-price examination when there is none?

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