Rejection French-speaking chamber

Two irregular tenders, one second chance: after an open procedure the Agence du Numérique lets Huwise cut its price by 43.62%, and the Council of State sees no misuse of procedure

Ruling nr. 267912 · 2 October 2026 · VIe kamer

When the open procedure for a Walloon Open Data platform produced only irregular tenders, the Agence du Numérique switched to a negotiated procedure in which both tenderers could also correct substantial irregularities; Huwise came down from 5.2 to 2.9 million euros and won, and the Council of State dismissed Jems Datafactory’s extreme-urgency application because the specifications expressly allowed that regularisation, both tenderers had changed their price and the file showed a concrete price check.

What happened?

The Agence du Numérique (AdN), the Walloon public-law limited company tasked among other things with structuring and disseminating data across the Walloon territory, tendered a services framework agreement for an Open Data platform and the associated support (specifications no. 202424, contract AdN 2024-24). The tenderer had to offer a platform and host, maintain, develop and technically support it itself. The AdN acted as a central purchasing body for itself and for a long list of beneficiary authorities: Walloon municipalities and their CPAS, inter-municipal companies, the Service public de Wallonie, public-interest bodies, the Walloon Parliament and the French Community. It was an open procedure, with a single contractor, for a maximum of four years, and the specifications set a ceiling of 3,000,000 euros excluding VAT. The contract notice was published on 20 November 2025 in the Belgian tender bulletin and the Official Journal of the EU. A corrigendum of 26 January 2026 then required three packages: a ‘basic’ solution for a small municipality, an ‘intermediate’ one for a regional agency and a ‘complete’ one for an inter-municipal company or the Walloon Region; the inventory was adjusted accordingly, because the original version was oversized for many beneficiaries. On 9 February 2026 two French companies submitted tenders: Jems Datafactory and Huwise SAS. The evaluation report of 1 April 2026 found both substantially irregular. Jems Datafactory had not completed the inventory and used a classic model with an upfront fixed development cost, whereas the AdN wanted only variable costs per category of beneficiary; according to the report this tender placed a ‘massive CAPEX’ on the AdN, inconsistent with the logic of a central purchasing body, and its schedule did not provide for availability in 2026. Huwise imposed its own general terms and reservations, did not demonstrably support the Belgian federal metadata standard DCAT AP2 and the Inspire ISO 19115 and 19119 standards, and asked 5,226,320 euros excluding VAT — 74.21% above the estimate, so that its tender was also unacceptable. Neither had attached a statement that no subcontractor would be used. On 2 April 2026 the board ended the open procedure and, under Article 38(1), first paragraph, 2°, of the Law of 17 June 2016, switched to a competitive procedure with negotiation without a new notice, involving only the two tenderers. An addendum added a point II.F.7 to the specifications: before negotiations, the authority ‘allows tenderers’ to regularise substantial irregularities as well. Both tenderers first had to resubmit a ‘strictly identical’ tender. After telephone meetings on 5 May they were given until 21 May 2026 to regularise. Huwise submitted a compliant inventory for 2,946,420 euros excluding VAT and was in order. Jems Datafactory came to 4,435,440 euros, but its inventory again did not follow the mandatory template, and the AdN found new substantial irregularities. After a Teams meeting on 9 July, the AdN wrote on 13 July inviting Jems ‘for the third and last time’ to complete the inventory correctly, and only the inventory. On 15 July it succeeded; the tender was regular, at 4,185,160 euros. The AdN then asked both tenderers for a best and final offer (BAFO), on price only. On 20 July Jems asked whether it could use a different inventory format, for ‘an innovative approach to pricing’; the AdN refused. In the BAFO of 23 July 2026 Jems came down to 3,347,568.92 euros excluding VAT; Huwise kept its price of 2,946,420 euros. On the second award criterion, the relevance and quality of the technical part, Huwise scored 54 out of 60 and Jems 48. On 18 August 2026 the board awarded the framework agreement to Huwise. On 1 September 2026 Jems Datafactory applied for suspension under extreme urgency, with three pleas. One: a substantially irregular and even unacceptable tender could not be regularised, certainly not on price and on the minimum technical requirements, and the switch to the negotiated procedure was a misuse of procedure. Councillor of State Florence Piret, sitting alone as acting president, disagreed. Point II.F.7 expressly allowed regularisation, and the present tense (‘permet’) even made it an obligation. The rules establish no hierarchy between substantial irregularities. Huwise had changed its price, but Jems had done so itself three times. Huwise came down by 43.62% and Jems by 24.53%, and both knew the same ceiling of 3,000,000 euros; both were also told that for the smallest beneficiaries an indicative price of 10,000 euros including VAT seemed ‘reasonable’. That tenders were ‘rewritten’ during regularisation applied to both. Negotiations had indeed taken place and competition had been reopened, even if in the end only on price. Two: the AdN had not checked the prices concretely, and a 43.62% drop should have triggered an abnormally-low-price inquiry. That failed too. The evaluation report referred to a ‘bill of quantities’ instead of an inventory, but that was a slip of the pen. A confidential internal note, which the AdN’s counsel described at the hearing as a ‘roadmap’ for the regularisation and negotiation phases, showed that the AdN had checked whether the lower price still covered all essential functionalities, and that it explained the drop by the nature of the solution: an existing, proven SaaS product. The final price was close to the estimate and to Jems’s price; the 12% gap between the two final tenders was explained by different economic models. Article 35 of the Royal Decree of 18 April 2017 does not require asking for a price breakdown or checking accounting documents, and an authority that finds no suspicious price need not start the Article 36 procedure. Three: the AdN allegedly used an unannounced requirement — a working platform ‘from mid-2026’ — and failed to state reasons for its scores. That date appeared only in the regularity review of the original tender, and because of delays in the procedure neither tenderer could meet it any more. The technical score was awarded ‘globally’, as the specifications announced, on four elements: the proposed functionalities, the implementation period, the scope for evolution and the tenderer’s experience. The report compared both tenders with their strengths and weaknesses: Jems scored on openness and customisability, Huwise on maturity, immediately available functionalities and Open Data references, which matched the contract’s aim of ‘quickly having a mature, proven, low-risk solution’. That the reasoning did not set out the content of the tenders in detail was explained by business secrecy, and Jems did not concretely criticise the assessment of its own tender. On 2 October 2026 the Council dismissed the application, in line with the concurring opinion of first auditor and head of section Christian Amelynck, and ordered immediate enforcement of the judgment. The tenders and documents filed confidentially remained confidential, and the AdN was granted the procedural indemnity of 770 euros it had requested.

Why does this matter?

The judgment gives a clear picture of what Article 38(1), first paragraph, 2°, of the Law of 17 June 2016 allows an authority to do when an open procedure produces only irregular or unacceptable tenders. It may switch without a new notice to a competitive procedure with negotiation with the same tenderers, have them resubmit an identical tender and, if the procurement documents expressly provide for it (Article 76(4) of the Royal Decree of 18 April 2017), also allow substantial irregularities to be regularised — up to and including the price. The Council refuses to rank irregularities: a price 74% above the estimate is treated no more severely than a wrongly completed inventory. For the unsuccessful tenderer that is a hard lesson, all the more so because it had itself changed its price three times during regularisation. The part on price verification is also useful. The authority need not explain in the award decision why a price is not abnormal, but the decision or at least the administrative file must show that it checked the prices concretely; here that appeared from a confidential internal note. A 43.62% price drop does not automatically require an abnormal-price inquiry if the new price is in line with the estimate and with the competitor, and if the authority has a plausible explanation (an existing SaaS product versus bespoke development). Finally, the judgment confirms that a global assessment of a qualitative criterion on four announced elements does not require a separate weighting per element, and that business secrecy rules out a detailed account of the competing tender in the reasoning.

The lesson

For contracting authorities: if, after a failed open procedure, you want to allow substantial irregularities to be corrected, write that expressly into the documents of the negotiated procedure, as the AdN did with point II.F.7, and treat all tenderers under the same rules. Give information that steers pricing — here the ceiling and an indicative price for the smallest beneficiaries — to everyone at the same time. Make sure your price verification is visible in the file, even if the reasoning itself stays short: an internal note explaining why a sharp price drop costs no functionality can make the difference. For bidders: a second chance through negotiation is also a second chance for your competitor. Follow the mandatory inventory template to the letter; Jems Datafactory needed three rounds of regularisation and even asked for its own format at the BAFO stage. If you challenge an award because the winner cut its price sharply, you must show that the price is abnormal or that the authority checked nothing, not merely point to the size of the drop. And criticism of the reasoning behind a technical score only carries weight if you state concretely what is wrong in the assessment of your own tender.

Ask yourself

As an authority: do the documents of your negotiated procedure state expressly whether substantial irregularities may be regularised, and which ones may not? Do all tenderers receive the same information on the ceiling and expected prices? Does your file show how you examined a sharp price drop? Do you assess a qualitative criterion on exactly the elements the specifications announce? As a bidder: do you complete the inventory according to the prescribed template, without your own cost structure or prices alongside it? If you challenge a competitor’s price drop, can you show that the price is abnormal rather than merely much lower? Do you know which points of your own technical assessment you can contest on the merits?

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The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →