Connection of Ghlin reservoirs to ORES network: suspension due to manifestly unreasonable decision not to postpone deadline after platform outage in last two hours
The Council of State suspends a contract award for connecting reservoirs to the ORES network, because the contracting authority committed a manifest error by not postponing the submission deadline after the e-Procurement platform's signature service was unavailable for over an hour during the last two hours before the deadline — the fact that one other tenderer could sign at the same time does not disprove the applicant's difficulties when the support service itself only confirmed 'a priori' that signatures should have been functional again.
What happened?
IDEA launched an open procedure for connecting infrastructure sites to the ORES network. On the submission deadline (15 April 2025, 14:00), the e-Procurement platform's signature service was unavailable from 12:38 to 13:40 — a general incident affecting all users. GENETEC contacted BOSA's helpdesk, which confirmed the incident and recommended contacting the authority for postponement. GENETEC deposited its offer at 13:51 without a valid electronic signature. Another tenderer (TECHNORD) managed to sign at the same time. BOSA later confirmed that signatures 'should a priori have been functional' from 13:40. IDEA declared GENETEC's and NEWELEC's offers substantially irregular for lacking a valid signature. IDEA justified not postponing: the service was restored at 13:40 leaving 20 minutes, the deadline had already been extended once, and the subsidizing authority imposed strict deadlines. The Council ruled that article 63(1) of the Royal Decree of 18 June 2017 (special sectors) grants discretion to postpone but this discretion is not unlimited. An outage of over one hour during the last two hours before the deadline is in principle much more problematic. BOSA's confirmation was only 'a priori.' Two tenderers could not sign. The fact that one other tenderer signed at 13:51 does not disprove the difficulties. IDEA committed a manifest error by not postponing. Suspension was ordered.
Why does this matter?
This ruling clarifies the limits of discretion regarding platform outages. An outage during the last hours before the deadline requires careful assessment. The fact that one tenderer could sign does not prove all could. The support service's 'a priori' confirmation of restoration is insufficient to justify not postponing when two tenderers were affected.
The lesson
As a contracting authority: when the e-Procurement platform is unavailable during the last hours before the deadline, be extremely cautious about not postponing. Your discretion is not unlimited. One tenderer's success in signing does not prove all tenderers could. As a tenderer: contact the BOSA helpdesk immediately when experiencing platform issues. Document all steps with timestamps. You do not lose standing if you contacted the helpdesk before the deadline, even if you inform the authority later.
Ask yourself
As a contracting authority: was the platform unavailable before the deadline? Did you consider the duration and timing of the outage? Could all tenderers actually sign? As a tenderer: did you contact the helpdesk and authority promptly? Did you document all steps and timestamps?
About this database
The Council of State (Raad van State / Conseil d'État) is Belgium's supreme administrative court. In disputes over public procurement — from contract awards to tenderer exclusions — the Council of State is the final arbiter. The rulings in this database are summarised by TenderWolf in plain language, with practical lessons for tenderers and contracting authorities. View all rulings →